By Armand Gosu and Octavian Manea, June 22, 2015

The new National Defense Strategy represents Romania’s response to the regional crisis triggered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine.

The fact that the Strategy is called one of defense, rather than security, is not the result of a simple confusion of terms. Suspected of having emerged from the shadow of the old communist Securitate, the new Romanian elite after December 1989 was obsessed with avoiding the word “security,” even when it did not refer to the Department of State Security. Thus, instead of speaking about the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Constitution, in Art. 65, para. 2(f), stipulates the “approval of the defense strategy” by the joint Chambers of Parliament. Similarly, the Law on Defense Planning, adopted in November 2004, states that the president, no later than six months after taking office, must present the “national defense strategy” (SNAp) to parliament.

This allergy to the word “security” generated severe confusion, to the extent that former President Traian Băsescu—despite the law and the Constitution—named the 2006 strategy a “security” one, while the subtitle of the 2010 strategy contained the word “security.” The team of advisors to President Klaus Iohannis who drafted the new document resolved the issue differently, giving the concept of defense the broader meaning associated with security. Thus, Article 3 specifies that SNAp covers not only defense but also public order, intelligence, counterintelligence, and security activities, as well as education, healthcare, the economy, energy, finance, the environment, and critical infrastructures. Previous strategies (2006 and 2010) also referred to many of these domains. The “integrative and multidimensional approach,” as specified in the SNAp, is rather a local adaptation of standard themes from Euro-Atlantic discourse, which is dominated by notions such as the “whole of government approach,” “comprehensive approach,” or “unity of effort.” These refer to integrating all instruments of national power to respond to a security environment which, as noted in the Polish strategy that partly inspired the Romanian document’s drafters, is characterized by the blurring of “boundaries between internal/external, military/non-military.”

Without any public debate on the SNAp draft, as had occurred with the 2006 and 2010 strategies, the president announced on Friday, June 5, that he would invite political parties on Monday evening to present the text, and scheduled a Supreme Council of National Defense (CSAT) meeting for Tuesday, June 9, during which the document was approved. SNAp was overshadowed by the political crisis sparked by the prime minister’s refusal to resign following the start of criminal prosecution against him, as demanded by President Klaus Iohannis. Consequently, SNAp passed unnoticed and uncommented upon, with the first academic discussion scheduled for a day after President Iohannis would present it to parliament. Hastily and without serious debate, SNAp was unanimously approved (sic!) by the joint parliamentary committees on June 17, and subsequently presented to the diplomatic corps of EU and NATO member states.

Not even the accusation of presidentialism formulated by C. Popescu-Tăriceanu managed to animate the discussion. Thus, the latest SNAp breaks with the past tradition of public debate. The adoption of the first document of this kind, the Comprehensive Security Conception, was delayed by the split of the National Salvation Front (FSN) and the resignation of Petre Roman. In April 1994, the text received a favorable opinion from CSAT but was criticized by civil society for its national-communist conceptual wanderings. It wasn’t until the summer of 1999 that Emil Constantinescu presented an NSS that unequivocally assumed the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration. This document had the impact of a veritable revolution in Romanian security doctrine, shifting the focus from territorial defense to the fundamental interests and rights of citizens. For the first time, national security was no longer viewed as a predominantly military issue, but as one encompassing the economy, society, administration, public order, education, and healthcare, emphasizing the state’s obligations towards its citizens. Only the 2001 NSS, hastily drafted after the September 11 attacks, was similarly adopted without debate.

While the silhouette of Bin Laden was visible through the 2001 strategy, the 2006 one will go down in history for formulating a Romanian project in the Black Sea region, and the 2010 strategy for including “commissioned press campaigns aimed at denigrating state institutions” under its vulnerabilities chapter. The new SNAp represents Romania’s response to the regional crisis triggered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the destabilization of Ukraine. In fact, the US NSS (February 2015), as well as those of Poland (adopted in November 2014) and the Czech Republic (under public debate for several months, scheduled for adoption in September 2015), all respond to the challenges generated by Russia’s actions against Ukraine—the most severe security crisis since the end of the Cold War. This is without even mentioning Ukraine’s NSS, recently promulgated in Kyiv, or the Russian Federation’s new Military Doctrine, made public by the Kremlin late last year, whose primary objectives are to respond to the crisis situation in the region.

Russia is mentioned in the SNAp about ten times, either directly or indirectly through descriptions of situations that clearly point to it. Developments on the international stage have generated a “paradigm shift” at the “global level,” yet the document fails to clarify why it is “global” and whether this is a return to the Cold War “paradigm” or something else. More specifically, Article 35 accuses Russia of “violating the norms of international law, questioning the international order, preserving frozen conflicts, and annexing Crimea,” while Article 42 states that Russia is “trying to consolidate its power status on a regional level,” with its actions affecting “regional stability and the European path of Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia.” Russia’s presence is also felt behind provisions regarding the combatting of “asymmetric and hybrid threats,” increasing regional cooperation within NATO, protecting activities in Romania’s Exclusive Economic Zone in the Black Sea, ensuring “counterintelligence protection of national interests,” energy security, and cyber threats. In this same asymmetric, subversive dimension—which predominantly requires non-military leverage—corruption, tax evasion, and the proper functioning of the justice system are also mentioned, turning them into security issues. “Corruption can strike at the heart of national security,” stated Sarah Sewall, a senior US State Department official, last year.

The Polish strategy, although three times as long, mentions Russia directly fewer times; it identifies risks of regional and local conflicts that could affect Poland directly or indirectly, noting that in its “immediate vicinity” there is a “large concentration of military forces, including in offensive positions.” Russia’s aggressive policy (the annexation of Crimea and the war in Ukraine) has a negative impact on regional security, the document adds. Warsaw’s primary security partners are the US, the Weimar Triangle (Germany and France), the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), the Nordic Group (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), and Romania, nominated in this order several times across the pages of the Polish NSS.

A parallel reading shows that, in both Polish and Romanian perspectives, NATO and the US strategic presence in Europe are decisive variables for the continent’s security. For both states, NATO remains the main guarantor of national security. However, while for Poland the guarantee of collective defense is anchored in solidarity among allies, for Romania the binder of NATO and the coherence and consistency of the Alliance’s actions lie in the transatlantic relationship. In the sphere of strategic partnerships, particularly in the defense dimension, the one with the US predominates. Specifically, Poland “will make efforts to ensure the most extensive US military presence possible in Europe, including in Poland.” All these factors indicate natural premises for a Romanian-Polish strategic partnership that truly matters on the defense dimension, especially since both states affirm the intensification of cooperation with NATO Eastern Flank countries as a core objective.

For a defense strategy intended to remain relevant to security trends until 2019, SNAp has a major omission. It fails to identify a structural variable that fundamentally reconfigures the European defensive landscape and acquires particular significance for NATO’s Eastern Flank, especially after the annexation of Crimea. The anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) systems being developed by Russia can keep the Alliance’s potential rapid reaction forces at bay. Consequently, all this generates implications for NATO’s posture, the military modernization processes of border states like Romania, and their strategies. These already represent a major concern for NATO today, not in 2019. Asked on June 12 in Wrocław how the Euro-Atlantic environment had changed since last year’s summit in Wales, General Ben Hodges, commander of US Army Europe, replied: “President Putin has significantly enhanced his ability to deny access in the Baltic region and the Black Sea. The long-range systems in Kaliningrad and Crimea, the air defense systems, the electronic warfare capabilities are significant, and we cannot assume that, in the event of an emergency in Eastern Europe, we will have the time to build up our capabilities and forces.”

Note: This material was published in “22” magazine.